In new years, Europe has gifted a record influx of haven seekers journey conflicts in Syria and other essentially Muslim countries. This call of Muslim migrants has stirred discuss about immigration and confidence policies in countless countries and has lifted questions about a stream and destiny series of Muslims in Europe.
To see how a distance of Europe’s Muslim race might change in a entrance decades, Pew Research Center has modeled 3 scenarios that change depending on destiny levels of migration. These are not efforts to predict what will start in a future, yet rather a set of projections about what could start underneath opposite circumstances.
The baseline for all 3 scenarios is a Muslim race in Europe (defined here as a 28 countries now in a European Union, and Norway and Switzerland) as of mid-2016, estimated during 25.8 million (4.9% of a altogether population) – adult from 19.5 million (3.8%) in 2010.
Even if all emigration into Europe were to immediately and henceforth stop – a “zero migration” unfolding – a Muslim race of Europe still would be approaching to arise from a stream spin of 4.9% to 7.4% by a year 2050. This is given Muslims are younger (by 13 years, on average) and have aloft flood (one child some-more per woman, on average) than other Europeans, mirroring a tellurian pattern.
A second, “medium” emigration unfolding assumes that all interloper flows will stop as of mid-2016 yet that new levels of “regular” emigration to Europe will continue (i.e., emigration of those who come for reasons other than seeking asylum; see note on terms below). Under these conditions, Muslims could strech 11.2% of Europe’s race in 2050.
Finally, a “high” emigration unfolding projects a record upsurge of refugees into Europe between 2014 and 2016 to continue indefinitely into a destiny with a same eremite multiple (i.e., mostly done adult of Muslims) in serve to a standard annual upsurge of unchanging migrants. In this scenario, Muslims could make adult 14% of Europe’s race by 2050 – scarcely triple a stream share, yet still intensely smaller than a populations of both Christians and people with no sacrament in Europe.
The interloper flows of a final few years, however, are intensely high compared with a chronological normal in new decades, and already have begun to decrease as a European Union and many of a member states have done routine changes directed during tying interloper flows (see sidebar).
How pivotal terms are used in this report: Regular migrants, haven seekers and refugees
Migrants: This extended difficulty includes all people relocating opposite ubiquitous borders to live in another country.
Regular migrants/other migrants: People who legally pierce to Europe for any reason other than seeking haven – e.g., for economic, educational or family reasons.
Asylum seekers: Migrants who request for interloper standing on entrance to Europe. Asylum seekers whose requests for haven are deserted can interest a welfare yet can't legally stay in Europe if a interest is denied.
Refugees: Successful haven seekers and those who are approaching to accept authorised standing once their paperwork is processed. Estimates are formed on new rates of capitulation by European finish nation for any start nation (among first-time applicants) and practiced for withdrawals of haven requests, that occur, for example, when haven seekers pierce to another European nation or outward of Europe.
In limbo: Asylum seekers whose focus for haven has been or is approaching to be denied. Though this race might sojourn temporarily or illegally in Europe, these migrants are released from a race estimates and projections in this report.
Predicting destiny emigration levels is impossible, given emigration rates are connected not usually to domestic and mercantile conditions outward of Europe, yet also to a changing mercantile conditions and supervision policies within Europe. Although nothing of these scenarios will play out accurately as projected, any provides a set of severe parameters from that to suppose other probable outcomes. For example, if unchanging emigration continues during new levels, and some asylum seekers also continue to arrive and accept interloper standing – yet not as many as during a historically well-developed swell of refugees from 2014 to 2016 – afterwards a share of Muslims in Europe’s race as of 2050 would be approaching to be somewhere between 11.2% and 14%.
While Europe’s Muslim race is approaching to grow in all 3 scenarios – and some-more than double in a middle and high emigration scenarios – Europe’s non-Muslims, on a other hand, are projected to decline in sum series in any scenario. Migration, however, does lessen this decrease somewhat; scarcely half of all new migrants to Europe (47%) were not Muslim, with Christians creation adult a next-largest group.
Taken as a whole, Europe’s race (including both Muslims and non-Muslims) would be approaching to decrease intensely (from about 521 million to an estimated 482 million) yet any destiny migration. In a middle emigration scenario, it would sojourn roughly stable, while in a high emigration unfolding it would be projected to grow modestly.
The impact of these scenarios is disproportionate opposite opposite European countries (see maps below); due in immeasurable partial to supervision policies, some countries are many some-more influenced by emigration than others.
Countries that have viewed comparatively immeasurable numbers of Muslim refugees in new years are projected to knowledge a biggest changes in a high emigration unfolding – a usually one that projects these complicated interloper flows to continue into a future. For instance, Germany’s race (6% Muslim in 2016) would be projected to be about 20% Muslim by 2050 in a high unfolding – a thoughtfulness of a fact that Germany has supposed many Muslim refugees in new years – compared with 11% in a middle unfolding and 9% in a 0 emigration scenario.
Sweden, that also has supposed a comparatively high series of refugees, would knowledge even incomparable effects if a emigration levels from 2014 to mid-2016 were to continue indefinitely: Sweden’s race (8% Muslim in 2016) could grow to 31% Muslim in a high unfolding by 2050, compared with 21% in a middle unfolding and 11% with no serve Muslim migration.
By contrast, a countries projected to knowledge a biggest changes in a middle unfolding (such as a UK) tend to have been destinations for a tip numbers of unchanging Muslim migrants. This unfolding usually models unchanging migration.
And countries with Muslim populations that are generally young, or have a comparatively immeasurable series of children, would see a many poignant change in a 0 emigration scenario; these embody France, Italy and Belgium.
Some countries would knowledge tiny change in any of a scenarios, typically given they have few Muslims to start with or low levels of immigration (or both).
The starting indicate for all these scenarios is Europe’s race as of mid-2016. Coming adult with an accurate count of Muslims now in Europe, however, is not a elementary task. The 2016 estimates are formed on Pew Research Center research and projections of a best accessible census and consult information in any nation sum with information on immigration from Eurostat and other sources. While Muslim temperament is mostly totalled directly, in some cases it contingency be estimated indirectly formed on a inhabitant origins of migrants (see Methodology for details).
One source of doubt is a status of haven seekers who are not postulated interloper status. An estimated 3.7 million Muslims migrated to Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016, including approximately 2.5 million unchanging migrants entering legally as workers, students, etc., as good as 1.3 million Muslims who have or are approaching to be postulated interloper standing (including an estimated 980,000 Muslim refugees who arrived between 2014 and mid-2016).
Based on new rates of capitulation of haven applications, Pew Research Center estimates that scarcely a million (970,000) additional Muslim haven seekers who came to Europe in new years will not have their applications for haven accepted, formed on past rates of capitulation on a country-by-country basis. These estimates also take into comment approaching rates of withdrawals of requests for interloper standing (see Methodology for details).
Where these haven seekers “in limbo” eventually will go is unclear: Some might leave Europe willingly or be deported, while others will sojourn during slightest temporarily while they interest their haven rejection. Some also could try to stay in Europe illegally.
For a destiny race projections presented in this report, it is insincere that usually Muslim migrants who already have – or are approaching to benefit – authorised standing in Europe will sojourn for a prolonged term, providing a baseline of 25.8 million Muslims as of 2016 (4.9% of Europe’s population). However, if all of a approximately 1 million Muslims who are now in authorised dilapidation in Europe were to sojourn in Europe – that seems doubtful – a 2016 baseline could arise as high as 26.8 million, with sputter effects opposite all 3 scenarios.
These are a few of a pivotal commentary from a new Pew Research Center demographic research – partial of a broader bid to plan a population expansion of eremite groups around a world. This report, that focuses on Muslims in Europe due to a fast changes brought on by a new liquid of refugees, provides a initial estimates of a flourishing distance of a Muslim race in Europe following a call of refugees between 2014 and mid-2016. It uses a best accessible information sum with determination and projection methods grown in before Pew Research Center demographic studies. The projections take into comment a stream distance of both a Muslim and non-Muslim populations in Europe, as good as ubiquitous migration, age and sex composition, flood and mankind rates, and patterns in conversion. (See Methodology for details.)
Europe’s Muslim race is diverse. It encompasses Muslims innate in Europe and in a far-reaching accumulation of non-European countries. It includes Sunnis, Shiites, and Sufis. Levels of eremite joining and faith change among Europe’s Muslim populations. Some of a Muslims enumerated in this news would not news Muslim temperament as distinct in their daily lives. For others, Muslim temperament profoundly shapes their daily lives. However, quantifying eremite friendship and categories of Muslim temperament is outward a range of this report.
Between mid-2010 and mid-2016, a series of Muslims in Europe grew intensely by healthy boost alone – that is, estimated births outnumbered deaths among Muslims by some-more than 2.9 million over that period. But many of a Muslim race expansion in Europe during a duration (about 60%) was due to migration: The Muslim race grew by an estimated 3.5 million from net emigration (i.e., a series of Muslims who arrived reduction a series who left, including both unchanging migrants and refugees). Over a same period, there was a comparatively tiny detriment in a Muslim race due to eremite switching – an estimated 160,000 some-more people switched their eremite temperament from Muslim to another sacrament (or to no religion) than switched into Islam from some other sacrament or no sacrament – nonetheless this had a middle impact compared with births, deaths and migration.1
By comparison, a non-Muslim race in Europe declined somewhat between 2010 and 2016. A healthy decrease of about 1.7 million people in a non-Muslim European race modestly outnumbered a net boost of non-Muslim migrants and a middle net change due to eremite switching.
The rest of a news looks during these commentary in incomparable detail. The initial territory examines a series of migrants to Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016, including patterns by sacrament and interloper status. The subsequent territory sum a tip start and finish countries for new migrants to Europe, including in any box a estimated commission of Muslims. One sidebar looks during European open opinion toward a swell in refugees from countries like Iraq and Syria; another summarizes trends in supervision policies toward refugees and emigration in sold countries and a EU as a whole. The following territory examines some-more deeply a 3 projection scenarios on a country-by-country basis. Finally, a final dual sections exhibit information on dual other pivotal demographic factors that impact race growth: flood and age structure.
This news was constructed by Pew Research Center as partial of a Pew-Templeton Global Religious Futures project, that analyzes eremite change and a impact on societies around a world. Funding for a Global Religious Futures plan comes from The Pew Charitable Trusts and a John Templeton Foundation.
Surge in refugees – many of them Muslim – between 2014 and mid-2016
Overall, regardless of sacrament or immigration status, there were an estimated 7 million migrants to Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016 (not including 1.7 million haven seekers who are not approaching to have their applications for haven approved).
Historically, a comparatively tiny share of migrants to Europe are refugees from assault or harm in their home countries.2 This continued to be a box from mid-2010 to mid-2016 – roughly three-quarters of migrants to Europe in this duration (5.4 million) were unchanging migrants (i.e., not refugees).
But a series of refugees has surged given 2014. During a three-and-a-half-year duration from mid-2010 to a finish of 2013, about 400,000 refugees (an normal of 110,000 per year) arrived in Europe. Between a commencement of 2014 and mid-2016 – a widen of usually dual and a half years – roughly 3 times as many refugees (1.2 million, or about 490,000 annually) came to Europe, as conflicts in Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan continued or intensified. (These sum do not embody an additional 970,000 Muslim haven seekers and 680,000 non-Muslim haven seekers who arrived between mid-2010 and mid-2016 yet are not projected to accept authorised standing in Europe.)
Of these roughly 1.6 million people who viewed interloper standing in Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016 (or are approaching to have their applications authorized in a future), some-more than three-quarters (78%, or 1.3 million) were estimated to be Muslims.3 By comparison, a smaller commission of unchanging migrants to Europe in this duration (46%) were Muslims, nonetheless this still severely exceeds a share of Europe’s altogether race that is Muslim and so contributes to Europe’s flourishing Muslim population. In fact, about two-thirds of all Muslims who arrived in Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016 were unchanging migrants and not refugees.
Altogether, a slim infancy of all migrants to Europe – both refugees and unchanging migrants – between mid-2010 and mid-2016 (an estimated 53%) were Muslim. In sum number, roughly 3.7 million Muslims and 3.3 million non-Muslims arrived in Europe during this period.
Non-Muslim migrants to Europe altogether between mid-2010 and mid-2016 were mostly done adult of Christians (an estimated 1.9 million), people with no eremite connection (410,000), Buddhists (390,000) and Hindus (350,000). Christians done adult 30% of unchanging migrants altogether (1.6 million unchanging Christian migrants; 55% of all non-Muslim unchanging migrants) and 16% of all refugees (250,000 Christian refugees; 71% of all non-Muslim refugees).
Syria is tip start nation not usually for refugees yet also for all Muslim migrants to Europe
Considering a sum liquid of refugees and unchanging migrants together, some-more migrants to Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016 came from Syria than any other country. Of a 710,000 Syrian migrants to Europe during this period, some-more than nine-in-ten (94%, or 670,000) came seeking retreat from a Syrian polite war, assault perpetrated by a Islamic State or some other strife.
An estimated nine-in-ten Syrian migrants (91%) were Muslims. In this box and many others, migrants’ eremite multiple is insincere to compare a eremite multiple of their start country. In some other cases, information are accessible for migrants from a sold nation to a finish country; for example, there is a aloft share of Christians among Egyptian migrants to Austria than there is among those vital in Egypt. When available, this form of information is used to guess a eremite multiple of new migrants. (For some-more details, see a Methodology.)
After Syria, a largest sources of new refugees to Europe are Afghanistan (180,000) and Iraq (150,000). Again, in both cases, scarcely all of a migrants from these countries were refugees from conflict, and strenuous majorities from both places were Muslims.
Several other countries, however, were a start of some-more altogether migrants to Europe. India, for example, was a second-biggest source of migrants to Europe (480,000) between mid-2010 and mid-2016; really few of these migrants came as refugees, and usually an estimated 15% were Muslims.
The tip countries of start of migrants in authorised dilapidation are not indispensably a tip countries of start among legally supposed refugees. For example, comparatively few Syrians are in authorised limbo, while Albania, where fewer haven seekers come from, is a start of a immeasurable series of deserted applicants. Afghanistan, meanwhile, is both a vital source of legally supposed refugees and also a vital nation of start of those in authorised limbo.
Since a primary settlement for haven decisions is a reserve of a start country, quite dangerous countries, such as Syria, have many aloft acceptance rates than others. For some-more information on a countries of start of those in authorised dilapidation see Pew Research Center’s 2017 report, “Still in Limbo: About a Million Asylum Seekers Await Word on Whether They Can Call Europe Home.”
Syria also was by distant a singular biggest source of Muslim migrants to Europe altogether in new years. But Morocco, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Iran also sent substantial numbers of Muslim migrants to Europe between mid-2010 and mid-2016 – some-more than 1 million sum – and a immeasurable infancy of Muslims from these countries came to Europe as unchanging migrants and not as refugees.
Germany is tip finish for Muslim refugees; UK is heading finish for unchanging Muslim migrants
Germany was a finish for an estimated 670,000 refugees between mid-2010 and mid-2016 – some-more than 3 times as many as a nation with a next-largest number, Sweden (200,000). A identical series of unchanging migrants from outward Europe also arrived in Germany in new years (680,000). But religiously, refugees and other migrants to Germany demeanour really different; an estimated 86% of refugees supposed by Germany were Muslims, compared with usually 40% of unchanging migrants to Germany.
Germany has a largest race and economy in Europe, is generally located on a continent and has policies auspicious toward haven seekers (for some-more on EU policies toward refugees, see this sidebar). The UK, however, indeed was a finish for a incomparable series of migrants from outward Europe altogether between mid-2010 and mid-2016 (1.6 million). The UK voted in a 2016 referendum to leave a EU, that might impact immigration patterns in a future, yet it is still counted as partial of Europe in this report.
Relatively few new immigrants to a UK (60,000) were refugees, yet some-more than 1.5 million unchanging migrants arrived there in new years. Overall, an estimated 43% of all migrants to a UK between mid-2010 and mid-2016 were Muslims.
Combining Muslim refugees and Muslim unchanging migrants, Germany was a finish for some-more Muslim migrants altogether than a UK (850,000 vs. 690,000).
France also viewed some-more than half a million Muslim migrants – essentially unchanging migrants – between mid-2010 and mid-2016, while 400,000 Muslims arrived in Italy. The dual countries supposed a sum sum of 210,000 refugees (130,000 by Italy and 80,000 by France), many of whom were Muslims.
Sweden viewed even some-more refugees than a UK, Italy and France, all of that have many incomparable populations. A immeasurable infancy of these 200,000 refugees (an estimated 77%) were Muslims; Sweden also viewed 250,000 unchanging migrants, many of whom were Muslims (58%). Overall, 300,000 Muslim migrants – 160,000 of whom were refugees – arrived in Sweden in new years. Only Germany, a UK, France and Italy viewed some-more Muslim migrants to Europe altogether given mid-2010. But given Sweden is home to fewer than 10 million people, these arrivals have a bigger impact on Sweden’s altogether eremite multiple than does Muslim emigration to incomparable countries in Western Europe.
These estimates do not embody emigration from one EU nation to another. Some countries, quite Germany, viewed a immeasurable series of unchanging migrants from within a EU. In fact, with about 800,000 newcomers from other EU countries, Germany viewed some-more intra-EU migrants than unchanging migrants from outward a EU. Intra-EU migrants tend to have a identical eremite multiple to Europeans overall.
The series of Muslim haven seekers in authorised dilapidation – i.e., those who already have had or are approaching to have their applications for haven deserted – varies roughly from nation to country, mostly given of differences in policies on asylum, movement in a series of applications viewed and incompatible origins of those migrants. Germany, for example, has a high series of Muslim migrants in authorised dilapidation notwithstanding a comparatively low rejecting rate – generally given it has viewed such a immeasurable series of applications for asylum. Germany viewed about 900,000 applications for haven from Muslims between mid-2010 and mid-2016, and is projected to eventually accept 580,000 and reject roughly 320,000 – or somewhat some-more than one-third (excluding applications that were withdrawn).
This rejecting rate is identical to Sweden’s; Sweden eventually is approaching to reject an estimated 90,000 out of roughly 240,000 Muslim applications (again, incompatible withdrawals). France, meanwhile, is projected to reject three-quarters of applications from Muslims, withdrawal an “in limbo” race of 140,000 (out of 190,000 Muslim applications). Italy is approaching to reject about half of Muslim field (90,000 out of 190,000 applications), and a UK is projected to reject 60,000 out of 100,000.
Data for a 2010 to 2013 duration are formed on focus welfare rates. But due to a multiple of still-unresolved applications and miss of extensive information on new decisions when this research took place, rejecting patterns for a 2014 to mid-2016 duration are estimated formed on 2010 to 2013 rates of rejecting for any start and finish nation span (for details, see Methodology). There is no eremite welfare fundamental to a haven regulations in Europe. However, if eremite harm is a reason for seeking asylum, that context (as against to eremite connection in and of itself) can be deliberate in a welfare process. Religion is estimated in this news formed on accessible information about countries of start and emigration upsurge patterns by sacrament – focus decisions are not reported by eremite group.
Iraqi and Syrian refugees viewed as reduction of a hazard in countries where some-more of them have sought asylum
Does open opinion toward refugees constantly spin disastrous as their numbers rise? Apparently not. In some European countries that have captivated immeasurable numbers of refugees from Iraq and Syria, open levels of regard about these refugees are comparatively low. Meanwhile, in some countries where there are fewer refugees from Iraq and Syria, a many aloft share of a open says they poise a “major threat,” according to a 2017 Pew Research Center survey.
For instance, Germany has been a primary finish nation for haven seekers from a Middle East, receiving 457,000 applications from Iraqis and Syrians between mid-2010 and mid-2016. Yet a share of people in Germany who contend “large numbers of refugees from countries such as Iraq and Syria” poise a “major threat” is among a lowest of all European countries surveyed (28%).
Similarly, in Sweden, usually 22% of a open says these refugees consecrate a “major threat.” Iraqi and Syrian haven seekers make adult an even incomparable share of Sweden’s race than Germany’s; there are 139 haven seekers from these countries for any 10,000 Swedes.
By contrast, majorities of a open in Greece (67%), Italy (65%) and Poland (60%) contend immeasurable numbers of refugees from countries such as Iraq and Syria paint a “major threat,” even yet there are comparatively few such haven seekers in these countries.4 Indeed, there are fewer than 10,000 people from Iraq and Syria seeking haven in Italy and Poland combined, representing one or fewer per 10,000 residents in any country.
This settlement is not universal. Hungary viewed 85,000 applications for haven from Iraqi and Syrian refugees between mid-2010 and mid-2016 – among a tip sum in Europe – and many Hungarians (66%) see this swell of refugees as a vital threat. Hungary’s supervision motionless to tie a extent with Croatia in October 2015, manufacture a blockade to keep migrants out. Tens of thousands of applications for haven in Hungary have been cold given 2015. (For some-more on supervision policies toward migration, see this sidebar.)
Concerns about refugees from Iraq and Syria, many of whom are Muslims, are tied to disastrous views about Muslims in general. In all 10 EU countries that were partial of a Pew Research Center consult in 2016, people who have an adverse perspective of Muslims are generally approaching to see a hazard compared with Iraqi and Syrian refugees. In a United Kingdom, for example, 80% of those who have an adverse opinion of Muslims contend immeasurable numbers of refugees from countries such as Iraq and Syria paint a vital threat. Among British adults who perspective Muslims favorably, usually 40% see a refugees as a vital threat.
EU restrictions on emigration tightening after surge
Changing supervision policies in European countries can have a vital impact on emigration flows. In new years, several European countries – and a European Union itself, behaving on interest of a member states – have adopted policies that have generally changed to tie Europe’s borders and to extent flows of migrants.
In 2016, a EU sealed a understanding with Turkey, a visit stop for migrants entrance from Syria. Under a terms of a deal, Greece, that shares a extent with Turkey, can lapse to Turkey all new “irregular” or bootleg migrants. In exchange, EU member states affianced to resettle some-more Syrian refugees vital in Turkey and to boost financial assist for those remaining there. By 2017, a agreement had reduced by 97% a series of migrants entrance from Turkey into Greece, according to a EU emigration commissioner.
Another common trail for immeasurable numbers of migrants to Europe is from sub-Saharan Africa to Italy, where they essentially arrive by sea from a Libyan coast. To try to branch a tide, Italy has worked with a Libyan seashore ensure to arise techniques to stop boats carrying a migrants, among other policies and tactics.
In addition, even Germany – a finish of some-more new haven seekers than any other European nation — has deported some migrants, including to Afghanistan, and moved toward worse extent controls. German Chancellor Angela Merkel, following a Sep 2017 choosing that saw a far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) celebration benefit a participation in council for a initial time, concluded to a limit of 200,000 haven seekers per year.
Sweden and Austria also have supposed high numbers of refugees, generally relations to their tiny populations. But in Nov 2015, leaders announced a tightening of Sweden’s interloper policy, requiring temperament checks to be imposed on all forms of transportation, and tying family reunification with refugees. And in an Oct 2017 election, Austrian electorate adored parties that had campaigned on holding a harder line on immigration.
Immigration – and not usually by refugees – has been a vital discuss emanate in several countries, and it was one of a pivotal factors in a Brexit discuss over either a UK, a finish of some-more unchanging migrants than any other European nation in new years, should sojourn in a European Union. In a issue of a 2016 referendum in that British electorate opted to leave a EU, UK supervision officials have vowed to mislay a nation from a freedom-of-movement policy, that allows EU adults to pierce to and work in EU member states yet carrying to request for visas, in Mar 2019.
How Europe’s Muslim race is projected to change in destiny decades
Pew Research Center’s 3 scenarios lifted a destiny distance of a Muslim race in Europe simulate doubt about destiny emigration flows due to domestic and amicable conditions outward of Europe, as good as changeable immigration policies in a region.
These projections start from an estimated baseline of 26 million Muslims in Europe as of 2016, that excludes haven seekers who are not approaching to benefit authorised status. Even with no destiny migration, Europe’s Muslim race is projected to boost by 10 million by 2050 formed on flood and age patterns (see here). If past levels of unchanging emigration continue in a destiny – yet with no some-more haven seekers — a Muslim race in Europe would boost to scarcely 58 million by midcentury (the middle scenario). And if a complicated interloper flows seen in new years were to continue in a destiny on tip of unchanging emigration (the high emigration scenario), there would be some-more than 75 million Muslims in Europe as of 2050.
In all 3 scenarios, a non-Muslim race in Europe is projected to cringe in sum series between now and 2050.
As of 2016, France and Germany have a tip numbers of Muslims in Europe. But in a middle emigration scenario, a United Kingdom would transcend them, with a projected 13 million Muslims in 2050 (compared with a projected 12.6 million in France and 8.5 million in Germany). This is given a UK was a tip finish nation for unchanging Muslim migrants (as against to refugees) between mid-2010 and mid-2016, and a middle unfolding assumes that usually unchanging immigration will continue.
Alternatively, in a high emigration scenario, Germany would have by distant a tip series of Muslims in 2050 – 17.5 million. This projection reflects Germany’s acceptance of a immeasurable series of Muslim refugees in new years. The high unfolding assumes that these interloper flows will continue in a entrance decades, not usually during a same volume yet also with a same eremite multiple (i.e., that many refugees will continue to come from essentially Muslim countries). Compared with a UK and France, Germany has viewed fewer unchanging Muslim migrants in new years.
Other, smaller European countries also are approaching to knowledge poignant expansion in their Muslim populations if unchanging emigration or an liquid of refugees continues (or both). For instance, in Sweden, a series of Muslims would stand threefold from fewer than a million (810,000) in 2016 to scarcely 2.5 million in 2050 in a middle scenario, and fivefold to roughly 4.5 million in a high scenario.
But some countries – even some immeasurable ones, like Poland – had really few Muslims in 2016 and are projected to continue to have really few Muslims in 2050 in all 3 scenarios. Poland’s Muslim race was roughly 10,000 in 2016 and would usually arise to 50,000 in a middle unfolding and 60,000 in a high scenario.
These flourishing numbers of Muslims in Europe, sum with a projected decrease of a non-Muslim population, are approaching to outcome in a rising share of Muslims in Europe’s altogether race in all scenarios.
Even if any EU nation and Norway and Switzerland immediately sealed a borders to any serve migration, a Muslim share of a race in these 30 countries would be approaching to arise from 4.9% in 2016 to 7.4% in 2050 simply due to prevalent demographic trends. In a middle emigration scenario, with projected destiny unchanging emigration yet no refugees, a Muslim share of Europe would arise to 11.2% by midcentury. And if high interloper flows were to continue in destiny decades, Europe would be 14% Muslim in 2050 – a substantial increase, nonetheless still a relations minority in a Christian-majority region.
Cyprus now has a tip share of Muslims in a EU (25.4%), due mostly to a chronological participation of essentially Muslim Turkish Cypriots in a northern partial of a island. Migration is not projected to dramatically change a Muslim share of a race in Cyprus in destiny scenarios.
In both a 0 and middle emigration scenarios, Cyprus would say a largest Muslim share in Europe in 2050. But in a high emigration scenario, Sweden – that was among a countries to accept a immeasurable series of refugees during a new swell – is projected to transcend even Cyprus. In this scenario, roughly three-in-ten Swedes (30.6%) would be Muslim during midcentury.
Even in a middle scenario, yet any destiny interloper flows, Sweden would be approaching to have a second-largest Muslim share (20.5%) as of 2050. If emigration were to stop altogether, a many smaller commission of Swedes (11.1%) would be Muslim in 2050.
Migration also drives a projected boost in a Muslim shares of France, a UK and several other countries. Both France and a UK are approaching to be roughly 17% Muslim by 2050 in a middle scenario, several commission points aloft than they would be if all destiny emigration were to stop. Because both countries have supposed many some-more Muslim unchanging migrants than Muslim refugees, France and a UK do not change as severely between a middle unfolding and a high scenario.
Germany, on a other hand, sees a thespian disproportion in a projected Muslim share depending on destiny interloper flows. The share of Muslims in Germany (6.1% in 2016) would boost to 10.8% in 2050 underneath a middle scenario, in that unchanging emigration continues during a new gait and interloper flows stop entirely. But it would arise distant some-more dramatically, to 19.7%, in a high scenario, if a new volume of interloper flows continues as well. There is a identical settlement in Austria (6.9% Muslim in 2016, 10.6% in 2050 in a middle unfolding and 19.9% in 2050 in a high scenario).
From now until midcentury, some countries in Europe could see their Muslim populations arise significantly in a middle and high scenarios. For example, a Muslim shares of both Sweden and a UK would arise by some-more than 10 commission points in a middle scenario, while several other countries would knowledge a identical boost in a high scenario. The biggest boost for a nation in any unfolding would be Sweden in a high unfolding – an boost of 22.4 commission points, with a commission of Muslims in a Swedish race rising to 30.6%.
Other countries would see usually extrinsic increases underneath these scenarios. For example, Greece’s Muslim race is approaching to arise by usually 2.4 commission points in a middle scenario. And frequency any change is projected in any unfolding in several Central and Eastern European countries, including Poland, Latvia and Lithuania.
In Europe overall, even if all Muslim emigration into Europe were to immediately and henceforth stop – a 0 emigration unfolding – a altogether Muslim race of Europe would be approaching to arise by 2.5 commission points, from a stream spin of 4.9% to 7.4% by 2050. This is given Muslims in Europe are intensely younger and have a aloft flood rate than other Europeans. Without any destiny migrants, these prevalent demographic trends would lead to projected rises of during slightest 3 commission points in a Muslim shares of France, Belgium, Italy and a UK.
Muslims have an normal of one some-more child per lady than other Europeans
Migration aside, flood rates are among a other dynamics pushing Europe’s flourishing Muslim population. Europe’s Muslims have some-more children than members of other eremite groups (or people with no religion) in a region. (New Muslim migrants to Europe are insincere to have flood rates that compare those of Muslims in their finish countries; for some-more details, see Methodology.)
Not all children innate to Muslim women will eventually brand as Muslims, yet children are generally some-more approaching to adopt their parents’ eremite temperament than any other.5
Taken as a whole, non-Muslim European women are projected to have a sum flood rate of 1.6 children, on average, during a 2015-2020 period, compared with 2.6 children per Muslim lady in a region. This disproportion of one child per lady is quite poignant given that flood among European Muslims exceeds deputy spin (i.e., a rate of births indispensable to means a distance of a population) while non-Muslims are not carrying adequate children to keep their race steady.
The disproportion between Muslim women and others varies intensely from one European nation to another. In some countries, a inconsistency is large. The stream estimated flood rate for Muslim women in Finland, for example, is 3.1 children per woman, compared with 1.7 for non-Muslim Finns.6
Among Western European countries with a largest Muslim populations, Germany’s Muslim women have comparatively low fertility, during usually 1.9 children per lady (compared with 1.4 for non-Muslim Germans). Muslims in a UK and France, meanwhile, normal 2.9 children – a full child some-more per lady than non-Muslims. This is one reason a German Muslim race – both in sum series and as a share of a altogether race – is not projected to keep gait with a British and French Muslim populations, solely in a high unfolding (which includes immeasurable destiny interloper flows).
In some countries, including Bulgaria and Greece, there is tiny disproportion in flood rates between Muslims and non-Muslims.
Over time, Muslim flood rates are projected to decline, squeezing a opening with a non-Muslim race from a full child per lady currently to 0.7 children between 2045 and 2050. This is given a flood rates of second- and third-generation immigrants generally turn identical to a altogether rates in their adopted countries.
The low flood rate in Europe among non-Muslims is mostly obliged for a projected decrease in a region’s sum race yet destiny migration.
Young Muslim race in Europe contributes to growth
European Muslims are strong in immature age groups – a share of Muslims younger than 15 (27%) is scarcely double a share of non-Muslims who are children (15%). And while one-in-ten non-Muslim Europeans are ages 75 and older, this is loyal of usually 1% of Muslims in Europe.
As of 2016, there is a 13-year disproportion between a median age of Muslims in Europe (30.4 years of age) and non-Muslim Europeans (43.8). Because a incomparable share of Muslims relations to a ubiquitous race are in their child-bearing years, their race would grow faster, even if Muslims and non-Muslims had a same flood rates.
As of 2016, France and Germany have a biggest age differences in Europe between Muslims and non-Muslims. The median age of Muslims in France is usually 27, compared with 43 for non-Muslims. Germany has an equally immeasurable opening (31 for Muslims, 47 for non-Muslims).
- Data on eremite switching patterns come from ubiquitous race surveys. In European countries, these surveys are generally sufficient for measuring rates of switching into Islam among those who were not lifted as Muslims. However, due to a comparatively tiny distance of Muslim populations in European countries, these surveys typically have too few Muslims to reliably guess patterns of switching out of Islam. Furthermore, a tiny series of respondents in these surveys who were lifted Muslim might not be deputy of all people lifted Muslim in a nation — respondents might be disproportionately digested and maybe some-more approaching than others in a nation who were lifted Muslim to news some form of eremite switching. However, in France, a large, delicately designed consult supposing sufficient statistical energy and methodological precautions to magnitude switching patterns among those lifted Muslim. In a deficiency of information on country-specific switching and influence patterns among those lifted Muslim, a switching patterns of respondents lifted Muslim in France have been used to indication influence in and switching out of Islam in other Western European countries. ↩
- Europe also gifted a immeasurable swell in refugees over a 1991 to 1995 duration due to a fall of Yugoslavia and a Bosnian War. ↩
- This comparatively high share of Muslims among refugees is a outcome of both a swell of migrants from essentially Muslim countries as good as a fact that applications for haven have been authorized during aloft rates for haven seekers from Syria and Iraq compared with other start countries. ↩
- Many haven seekers from North Africa cranky a Mediterranean to land in Italy. Italian respondents might have been deliberation this upsurge of intensity refugees when responding this consult question. ↩
- In France, roughly 10% of those lifted Muslim switch to brand with some other sacrament or with no sacrament as adults. Projections for Western European countries assume that rising cohorts of Muslims will knowledge a 10% desertion rate, sketch on a information from France, a usually Western European nation with an adequate representation for measuring switching patterns of those lifted Muslim. Patterns of switching to Islam are prisoner in country-specific surveys and are incorporated into projections. ↩
- The flood disproportion might be even incomparable between Muslims and non-Muslims in Spain and Italy, yet due to concerns about a trustworthiness of information in these countries, these values are not displayed. In European countries with tiny Muslim populations, information are not sufficient to reliably guess flood differences. ↩